ORGANICISM IN EARLY GERMAN ROMANTICISM AND IN NAZISM

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of History

Appalachian State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in History

---

by

Allen Dean Haynes

August 1967

ORGANICISM IN EARLY GERMAN ROMANTICISM
AND IN NAZISM

by

Allen Dean Haynes

Approved by:

Max Dizin
Chairman of the Thesis Advisory Committee

Malcolm O. Sartin
Major Professor

Edward N. Gibson II
Minor Professor

H. C. Yoder

Graduate Committee

Graduate Committee

Dean of the Graduate School

ORGANICISM IN EARLY GERMAN ROMANTICISM AND IN NAZISM

An Abstract of a Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History
Appalachian State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

---

by
Allen Dean Haynes
August 1967

I. THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was to investigate and establish the existence of organicism in early German Romanticism and in Nazism and 1) to determine the most obvious similarities of the two applications of the organic concept and 2) to show that the extreme assiduity of Nazi organicism had a good foundation in Romantic organicism.

II. PROCEDURE

Selected works of the German Romanticists were available in the Appalachian State University Library and through inter-library loan from the University of North Carolina. Much information was taken from compiled works of German authors, but was supplemented by appropriate secondary works. The material selected served as a representative sampling of organic concepts both in Romanticism and in Nazism. All primary materials from German sources were translations.

III. RESULTS

The material covered emphasized the importance of the organic interpretation of politics to the success of the Third Reich. It also gave an insight into the German treatment of the age-old conflict of individualism versus

authoritarianism. Just as the Greeks failed to solve the problem, so, too, the German Reich failed.

However, although organicism existed in German Romanticism and in Nazism, Romantic organicism begat creative genius whereas Nazi organicism gave birth to violence. From the evidence, racism seems to be the cancerous growth which perverted a naive Romantic organicism into an illegitimate child of Nazi romanticism and Prussian militarism. Therefore, Nazi ideology was not new, but reactionary: its roots obtained nourishment from at least two sources, German culture (lore, legend, and myth) and Romantic organicism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work could not have been completed had it not been for the aid given to me by Dr. Robert Ramsey, Dr. Daniel Rice, Dr. Malcolm Partin, Mrs. Lyndia Goodwin, and Miss Juanita Lewis. I wish to thank: Dr. Ramsey for his time, trouble, and consideration in supervising and directing the research and writing of this entire work; Dr. Daniel Rice for his advice concerning organic philosophy; Dr. Malcolm Partin for his advice on structure and style and for his service in the capacity of a reader; Mrs. Lyndia Goodwin for her valuable and needed assistance in finding materials in the stacks of the library; Miss Juanita Lewis for her patience in typing and retyping, reading and rereading each sentence, each page of this work for omitted punctuation, grammar, lucidity of style, and continuity of thought.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In the beginning there was Immanuel Kant; in the end, Adolf Hitler; in the middle, countless dead who gave their measure of "pure" and "un-pure" blood which stained the soil under the ash-darkened skies of Europe and Asia. From Hegelian pedantic ivory towers to concentration camps, from the simple sublimity of Beethoven to the violent crassness of Wagner, from mystic truth to mystic fable, German Romanticism gestated through one century to be born in another--full grown, in full armor--not from the head of Odin, but from the collective mind of the German Volk; a thing not content with just being but in constantly becoming. Therefore, the Nazi flower did not bloom from shallow root or flimsy stem. The seeds were planted and steeped in distinctly German culture from which they drank deeply of German mysticism resulting in a cultural application of politics.

Thus, the rise or fall of Nazi Germany was not merely the rise or fall of Adolf Hitler, but the rise and fall of a people, a whole nation; a people who marched with the thunder of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse across the Polish frontier on September 1, 1939. There were comparatively few unbelievers in the newly consecrated Reich. Three categories of people made up the populace outside the Volk-Reich; exiles, slaves, and the dead.

Although the germ of Nazism was bred in the romantic fold, this preface is in no way meant to maintain that Hitlerite romantics were comparable to the Kantian, Hegelian, or Fichtean romantics in wisdom, education, honor, or dignity; the Nazi vocabulary being void in relation to the latter two. But it can be inferred that Nazi faiths were incarnations of nineteenth-century romantic thoughts with certain expedient, evolutionary, "philosophical" alterations. These faiths concern the three pillars of Nazi power; the Volk, the Reich, the Führer.

Therefore, a study of German Romanticism (for it is a distinct type) comparing Kant to Hitler is an examination of a moving paradox; the German spirit which became Nazism. This spirit was born naive and clean during the first romantic revolution of the late seventeen hundreds, was perverted by the Wagnerites, and was coddled, pruned, and further perverted by the second romantic revolution during the closing years of the nineteenth century. Finally, under Nazi solicitude, this spirit came of age grotesquely warped. It was an evolution from the pure to the common, from the sublime to the demonic.

Even after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, when a united Bismarckian Germany occupied the attention of nations, German Romanticism remained as it had always been from its inception--an undercurrent--strong and swift at

times, eddying and still at others. Only with the advent of Hitler did the undercurrent surge to the surface. But there was one big difference. The early romantics were bringers of light compared with Hitlerite seekers of light.

Any discussion of German Romanticism is, by necessity, a debate on what organicism in nature and society really is. Therefore, any study of Nazism would have to be from an organic point of view. This is the basis of Nazi ideology; organicism gone wild, a romantic concept of totality. According to a romantic, Volk is State, Führer is Volk, State is Führer; all is all, a never ending entity. To consider one is to consider all; for one is but a quality of the whole possessing all the characteristics of the whole. From an organic view, to see one German--as the Nazis saw a true "blooded" German--is to see all Germans, for one embodies the soul of the entire German Volk. It is in his mind and veins, his soul and spirit to be nothing else.

Inclusion of Immanuel Kant in the early school of organic romantic thought would be presumptuous if the entire Kantian Philosophy were considered. However, there is evidence, in early Kant, of the romantic temperament as found in his Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764). Further romantic elements exist in post-Critique Kant as typified in his small volume, Perpetual Peace (1795).

No doubt Kant was influenced by Rousseau and the cosmopolitan romantic thought eminent in France during the latter part of the eighteenth century. However, this did not hinder his development of German national thought. Although Kant belonged to the Enlightenment and not properly to any school of romantics, he did influence them, especially Goethe, Schiller, Fichte, and Hegel.

Hence, the purpose of this work is to delve into romantic organicism as it is related to Nazism. The early school of German Romanticism (1764-1833) served as a seed-bed for the organicism which gave rise to rampant nationalism tempered by no restraint. At first, the romantics spoke only to intellectuals. At last, through the perversive influence of more than a century and a quarter, these same ideas spoke not to the well-educated or to the un-educated, but to the waiting semi-educated mass of Germans.

In order to maintain the proper perspective, one must remain mindful of the historical factors during the two periods under consideration. 1) The first German romantic revolution occurred as a reaction not only to the Enlightenment but also as a legacy of, and a reaction to, the French Revolution and Napoleon. 2) The first revolution took place among intellectuals in an agrarian Germany. 3) The third romantic revolution (the Nazi era) took place among pseudo-intellectuals in a desolate

Germany suffering under the Diktat of Versailles. As most historians agree, what happened in Germany from 1933 to 1945 could not have occurred had conditions not been ripe for its appearance. Organicism was the fertilizer of Nazism; organicism that germinated in the first German romantic school.

SECTION I

ORGANICISM IN EARLY GERMAN ROMANTICISM

CHAPTER I

IMMANUEL KANT

"The brilliant period of the German mind . . . lasted from 1760 to 1830, and . . . gave to the world Kant and Hegel, . . . Goethe and Schiller. . . ."[1] It is fitting that Kant should not only be listed among these great men, but also as the first of them. The little man from Königsberg probably would not have been a physical inspiration to the followers of Johann Lavater,[2] for Kant's worth consisted not of a body but of a deep mind and a beautiful spirit. Those who saw Kant on Philosopher's Walk in Königsberg and those who have read his works since and thought that Kant was involved only in the mystic world of intellect were mistaken. Johann Gottfried von Herder was Kant's pupil and whether he agreed with Kant's philosophy or not, Herder recognized the inner Kant as "not being indifferent to anything worth knowing."[3]

---

[1] Hans Kohn, Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century (third edition, revised; New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 81.

[2] Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801) attempted to elevate physiognomy to a science. Most of his work was characterized by religious fervor and mysticism. His followers are noted for their aversion to physical ugliness.

[3] Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 7.

Much has been written by many authors in an effort to fathom the depth and scope of Kant. But the great majority of attention has been given to the Critique of Kant. Inadequate attention has been given to pre-Critical and post-Critical Kant. Here is where the romantic Kant is found; principally in two works, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) and Perpetual Peace (1795).

Some scholars have disagreed over whether Kant evolved through empiricism of sensation to rationalism of reason in order to write his Critiques. The greatest consensus seems to be that non-Critical Kant was most influenced by empiricism while the Critical Kant was rationalistic.[4] In the Observations, "Kant's laws of beauty were inductive, not deductive; and they were descriptive, not prescriptive."[5] "The Observations is addressed to cognition as integrated with the feelings and manifested in conduct. The method of the Critique is analytical; that of the Observations is inductive."[6] In other words, all things that are beautiful and sublime

---

[4] Ibid., p. 10.

[5] Ibid., p. 23. For further comments on beauty, see also Immanuel Kant, "Of the Ideal of Beauty," Analytic of the Beautiful from The Critique of Judgment, trans. Walter Cerf (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 39-45.

[6] Ibid., pp. 15-16. For subjectivity in judgment, see also Ibid., p. 5.

are sensations linked to us by the power of thought. These are things we know and feel but cannot understand.

Other writers, such as Lord Kames and Lord Shaftesbury, asserted what is recognizable as a sense of beauty while Kant dealt mainly with a feeling of beauty.[7] Distinction between these two is imperative to understanding the romantic quality of Kant. A sense of beauty is still subject to analysis, but a feeling is inherent, subjective, dependent upon intuition and therefore is not completely in the realm of explanation, thus transcendent of reason.[8] Further, external reflection of feeling (laughing, smiling, crying) is observable, but the feeling itself cannot be discerned.[9]

Beauty and sublimity, for Kant, was unity in great variety. "Night is sublime, day is beautiful. . . .[10] Understanding is sublime, wit is beautiful. . . .[11] The sublime must be simple; the beautiful can be adorned. . . . The sublime must always be great; the beautiful can also be small."[12] How did he know these things? Were feelings observable in people or were the evidences of feelings

---

[7] Ibid., p. 30.

[8] On Kant's objections to everything strictly transcendent, see Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1956), pp. 30-31.

[9] Kant, op. cit., p. 47.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 51.

[12] Ibid., p. 48.

observable in people? These were things Kant knew and felt--they are not explained.[13]

From 1764 to 1795, Kant developed ideas concerning the state of people and nature. Perpetual Peace was written with the hindsight of the Critiques and therefore was more tempered with logic than the Observations. However, Perpetual Peace contains more romantic particularisms than does the Observations which was more general than specific in tone. Instead of dealing with aesthetic qualities of abstract pleasure as he did with the sublime and beautiful ("The stirring of each is pleasant"[14]), Kant, in Perpetual Peace, applies aesthetic principles to men, the state, and society.

"A state is not," Kant says, "like the soil upon which it is situate, a patrimony. It consists of a society of men, over whom the state alone has a right to command and dispose. It is a trunk which has its own roots."[15] In this statement is found three main supports of later romantic arguments more fully developed by Hegel and Fichte. First, Kant infers that a state is not dependent

---

[13] Ibid., p. 45. Kant makes it quite clear that he intends to view beauty and sublimity "more with the eye of an observer than of a philosopher."

[14] Ibid., p. 46.

[15] Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: Morningside Hts., Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 3.

upon a particular soil but upon a particular people. It is people who form a state: where they do it is of no real consequence. Second, the state is an entity to itself, a trunk that carries its own reason (roots) for existence wherever its people may go. The roots are in the people, not the soil. Third, the state is a society of men over which the state is total, complete, and unquestionably in authority over itself and its roots. However, this authoritarianism is a point where Kant does not fully agree with his contemporary romantics.[16] Application of external law was repugnant to romantics who believed men should be responsible only to internal law or morality. But since Kant's state is a "trunk which has its own roots," the external law becomes internal law because a trunk and roots are one, thus agreeing with the romantic concept of Volk as State.

---

[16]George T. Whitney and David F. Bowers, The Heritage of Kant (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962); "The protection of the individual against undue interference upon the part of officers of the state is foreign to Kant. . . . It did not exist in the Prussia of his day. . . .," p. 285; "The state merely enforces order and is not concerned with helping individuals toward a richer life," p. 291. Romantics, such as Fichte and Schelling, thought that in a Volk-State, the government, since it arose from the people, had the duty to pursue happiness for individuals living within the fold. This will be more fully discussed in a following chapter on the ideas of Fichte and Schelling.

Kant recognized "that discipline is a vital factor in the good life"[17] as is well proved by his own life. But the internal discipline Kant applied to himself was relevant only to himself and operated within the external laws of his State. According to romantics, this was permissible since Volk and State are one and operating within the laws of the State would be the same as operating within the natural laws of the Volk.

> In Metaphysical Bases of the Theory of Law [Kant] declares that "the act through which a people constitutes itself a state, . . . is the original contract by which all . . . the people surrender their outward freedom in order to resume it at once as members of a common entity, that is, the people regarded as the state [italics mine]."[18]

This statement glares with romantic sentiment. The people surrender their external liberty to become internally free as a unity based upon a natural contract of nature. Further, Kant believed that it was the duty of every individual to attach himself to such a unity.[19] Moreover, this unity "[obligated] every lawgiver to promulgate his laws . . . [as if they had] risen from the united will of

---

[17] Ibid., p. 195.

[18] Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 35, as quoted from Kant, Rechtslehne, par. 47 (Werke, vii, 122).

[19] Whitney and Bowers, op. cit., p. 282.

the entire people. . . ."[20]

Therefore Kant was aware of nature and the natural responsibilities of man. He also recognized the effects of nature and man both positively and negatively. Kant became convinced that no one could obtain enough "knowledge of organized beings and their inner possibility . . . by looking merely to mechanical principles of nature."[21] To him, there was more feeling in nature than evidenced by pure mechanics. Nevertheless, Kant seldom allowed subjectivism to radically distort his observations of himself and of people in general.[22]

Although the term "romantic" cannot be applied to the whole Kant, there is a definite organicism present in his works. In the Observations, young Kant exhibits an awareness of universal beauty, a gentleness, and understanding of the splendor of life. These same elements did not escape expression in his Critiques. And if the term

---

[20]Cassirer, loc. cit., as quoted from Kant (Werke, vi, 380f).

[21]Ibid., p. 65, as quoted from Kant, Kritik der Urterlskraft, par. 75 (Werke, ed. Cassirer, V, 478f; tr. Meredith [Oxford, 1928], 54).

[22]For beauty and sublimity as evidenced generally in man, see Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime (trans. John T. Goldthwait, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 51-75; for relations and distinctions of feelings between the sexes, see pp. 76-96; for distinctions of feelings as related to particular nationalities, see pp. 97-116.

"rational romantic" is too contradictory, the term "reflective romantic" must be used to describe the elder Kant of Perpetual Peace. It was in this work that his organicism was most evident but he did not fail to point out man's frailties and the impedimentary stumbling blocks nature placed in man's path to lasting peace.[23]

Kant's influence on later romantics is immeasurable. It was Schiller who understood and interpreted Kant to the giant of German literature, Goethe.[24] Kant's twelve categories reached deep into Fichte,[25] Schelling, and Hegel who only refined a system of category deductibility begun by Kant.[26] Immanuel Kant was indeed first in

---

[23]For impediments to peace as found in sophist philosophy, see Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: Morningside Hts., Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 48-49; see also, ". . . . treacherous sophisms tend incessantly to persuade us that human frailty justifies every crime.", p. 56; for lack of concern of a sovereign for his people as an impediment to peace, see pp. 19 and 33-36.

[24]For Kant's influence on Schiller, see Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, pp. 74 and 88; on Goethe, see pp. 61-98.

[25]For Kant's discussion on what Fichte later called a nation's "right to compel," see Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 11; for Kant's influence on Fichte, see Hans S. Reiss, The Political Thought of the German Romantics: 1793-1815 (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell and Mott, 1955), pp. 11-12 and 44; see also Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1956), pp. 51-57; and Hans Kohn, Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century (third edition, revised; New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 25-26.

[26]Whitney and Bowers, Heritage of Kant, p. 167.

laying the groundwork for the "brilliant period of the German mind." His mind and spirit laid the foundation from which the romantic house could be built.

Each man who studied Kant reflected him according to the individual personality of the student.

> The manner of . . . reflection was different for Schiller, for Goethe, for Beethoven. For Schiller, the study of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment was guiding and crucial. Goethe came to Kant by way of the Critique of Teleological Judgment; Beethoven was seized and carried away by the Critique of Practical Reason.[27]

It is no wonder, then, that these men exhibited the same gentleness, simple naivety, and unassuming freshness as did Kant. They were of the same mind, the same spirit, the same nature as Kant: they were his students as well as students of nature.

---

[27]Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, p. 98.

CHAPTER II

GOETHE AND SCHILLER

"Universal History . . . is . . . the History of the Great Men who have worked here. . . . The soul of the whole world's history, . . . were the history of these."[1] Goethe and Schiller fit into this category. Some historians believe Goethe--and perhaps Schiller--were among the last of the truly "universal" men. Goethe particularly is the epitome of the romantic concept of a man continually striving, of continually *becoming*.

Organicism appears throughout the works of both men. However, the greatest evidence of unity, totalness, and sweeping entirety appears in the works completed during their personal association with each other (1794-1805). These works include Schiller's *Wallenstein* and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* and his well-known *Faust*. These three works embody the poetic romantic ideas of both men to such an extent that other works can almost be ignored.

In speaking of the content of Schiller's *Demetrius*, Wilhelm von Humboldt said,

---

[1] Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* (New York: Doubleday-Dolphin, n.d.), p. 1.

> I know of no poem . . . which displays so wide a range, . . . which runs the gamut of all the deepest human emotions, and in wholly lyrical fashion shows life as if in an epic enclosed within natural bounds [Italics mine].[2]

Here is distinct evidence of Schiller's effect upon his contemporaries; of not only how Demetrius was written, but of what it contained. Still more concrete organicism appears in Wallenstein when the hero accuses Austria of not wanting peace.

> My care is for the whole: I have
> A heart--it bleeds within me for the miseries
> Of this German people . . .[3]

The hero was not concerned for an atomistic part of the people, but for the whole of the people. Moreover, his concern was not for the French or English, but for "this German people [Italics mine]."

Through feelings, Schiller was certain that men, who had departed from nature, could return to her fold. In speaking of the natural completeness of organisms in nature, such as trees and moss, Schiller equates men to these natural entities. He says, "We were nature as they are; and culture, following the way of reason and liberty, must bring us back to nature."[4] Once a return to nature

---

[2]Thomas Mann, Last Essays (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1959), p. 10.

[3]Ibid., p. 46, as translated from Schiller's Wallenstein by Thomas Mann.

[4]Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler, Gateway to the Great Books (London: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.,

--viewing things not in their parts but as a whole--is accomplished, man's freedom and happiness becomes a certainty. "As long as man dwells in a state of pure nature (I mean pure and not coarse nature), all his being acts at once like a simple sensuous unity, like a harmonious whole."[5] Schiller's prerequisite for harmony is simple. A people should return to Nature and violate no laws as to what Nature intended them to be.

Goethe, on the other hand, is more complex than Schiller for several reasons. 1) Goethe lived longer than Schiller. 2) Goethe was a student of Herder[6] while Schiller was a student of Kant. 3) Goethe experienced the Napoleonic era (Schiller died in 1805). 4) Goethe was a student of many subjects--a literary genius in every sense. Hence, Goethe's romanticism was more highly developed and more artfully expressed than was Schiller's. Even if Goethe had not created any art, his personality and life would have been evidence enough of his organic

---

William Benton, publisher, 1963), p. 156, as translated from Schiller's "On Simple and Sentimental Poetry," Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical.

[5] Ibid., p. 173.

[6] For a discussion of Herder's influence on Goethe according to Thomas Mann, see Thomas Mann, Last Essays (New York: Knopf, 1959), pp. 106-107; for further supporting evidence, see also Berthold Biermann, Goethe's World as Seen in Letters and Memoirs (New York: New Directions Books, 1949), pp. 58-59.

ideas.[7]

For example, Schiller wrote his impression of Goethe in a letter to Goethe in August, 1794. "Unfortunately, we [all others except Goethe] are only aware of what we can take apart."[8] But Schiller went on to say that due to a strong mind,

> [Goethe looked] at nature as a whole, [and] when [Goethe wanted] light thrown on her separate parts; [he looked] for the explanation of the individual in the totality of all her various manifestations [italics mine].[9]

In the same letter Schiller expressed admiration of Goethe's ability to re-create man, to imitate nature by "truly heroic thought," to see man as "one beautiful entity."[10]

One more remarkable sentiment is expressed in the same letter to Goethe; Schiller's nationalism. Schiller states that had Goethe been born any other nationality than German, his path and influence would have been shorter.[11] Moreover, Schiller thought Goethe had developed a "wild Northern nature" which enabled Goethe to exhibit an inward victorious genius.[12]

---

[7]The best example, among many, of Goethe's ever striving, ever becoming, is found in his last hours, his last breath, his last words, "Light--more light." For a vivid description of Goethe's death, see Thomas Mann, Freud, Goethe, Wagner (New York: Knopf, 1942), pp. 49-50.

[8]Berthold Biermann, Goethe's World as Seen in Letters and Memoirs (New York: New Directions Books, 1949), p. 207.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., pp. 208-209.

[12]Ibid., p. 208.

In another letter, August, 1794, Schiller recognized the essential difference between Goethe and himself. Schiller says:

> Your mind [Goethe's] works intuitively to an extraordinary degree. . . . My understanding works more in a symbolizing manner and thus I vacillate . . . between ideas and perceptions, between law and feeling. . . .[13]

Schiller felt his greatest difficulty was in his philosophical mind wanting to be poetic and *vice versa*.[14]

The greatest manifestation of Goethe's organicism, as well as some of his own, was pointed out by Schiller in a letter to Goethe, July, 1796, which discussed aspects of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*. Schiller said that "not only did the subject itself require this . . . character, but the *reader* also was in need of him [italics his]."[15] According to Schiller, the character Wilhelm, "[expressed] each individual thing in a general form. . . . [He fulfilled] his own character . . . and at the same time [fulfilled] the aim of the whole."[16] Further, Schiller felt that Wilhelm's value lay "in his mind, not in what he effect[ed], in his aspirations, not in his actions . . ."[17] In other words, Wilhelm's actions were excusable provided

---

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 211.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 212.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 218.

his aspirations for the whole were deemed good: genius with license.

Westerners are most familiar with Goethe through Faust. If Faust is read and re-read, one can detect elements of many things that can be called distinctly German even though Goethe was much more "European" than most German intellectuals. For instance, Goethe's Faust enters not into a pact with the devil--but a wager [Italics mine].[18] In typically Goethe (and German) fashion, Dr. Faust is the continually striving (becoming) man in search of the supreme moment of satisfaction. The devil wagers that he can give Faust this moment: Faust thinks not.[19]

> Faust: If with enjoyment you can fool me,
> Be that for me the final day! That bet
> I offer![20]

Therefore, Faust, the whole, striving man was never destined to reach fulfillment nor to say of any moment "Ah, linger on, thou art so fair!"[21] Mephisto was the loser from the start and no match for the true "romantic" man, the true

---

[18] William Rose, Men, Myths and Movements in German Literature (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1964), p. 79.

[19] Ibid., p. 80.

[20] Johann W. von Goethe, Faust (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955), p. 40, ll. 1696-1698.

[21] Ibid., p. 41, l. 1701.

German man.[22]

Organicism in Faust is not quite so evident as perhaps one would expect it to be. However, two facets of the work are immediately recognizable as organic processes. First, the hero is a man of nature and second, passages from the work have to be read as a whole since no single line has the meaning of the whole. Each line has its place and cannot be read ahead of or behind its position without distorting the passage. Proof of Faust's universality comes early in the work when the Spirit, which first visits Faust, speaks of roaming the world--seeing and being oceans, skies, and forests. Faust replies, "Thou busy spirit, how near I feel to thee!"[23]

In agreement with Schiller's opinion, the very personality of Goethe was organic. In a letter to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe discussed what genius meant.

> The best genius is the one which absorbs everything. . . . By training, instruction, success, failure, stimulus, . . . man's faculties, in their untrammeled, unconscious activity, unite acquired with innate traits, producing a unity which astounds the world /Italics mine/.[24]

---

[22]For mention of a man of letters as a genius, a "Superman," see Goethe, Faust (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955), p. 14, ll. 489-490.

[23]Ibid., l. 511.

[24]Mann, Last Essays, p. 97, as quoted from Goethe by Thomas Mann.

Apparently Goethe did not adhere to the common belief that a natural genius was by necessity an uneducated one. Nature gave genius "innate traits," but these gifts had to be developed through striving for knowledge.

Goethe impressed his associates with the completeness of his bearing as well as with his work. Wieland, the court poet at Weimar, resorted to verse to describe the Goethe who arrived at Weimar to take the political post of Director of the War Commission and Commission of Highways and Canals.

> He clasps nature whole, and still stands straight,
> Uncrushed by all that weight.
> He burrows into every living soul
> And still comprehends the whole.[25]

Goethe, much more than Schiller, for various reasons had ample opportunity to apply his organicism to politics. Goethe criticized shrewdness in government because such cunning stood in the way of thinking of the people and ruler as to the "terms of the organic whole they serve."[26] Not only does the ruler serve the will of the collective society but the individual's responsibility is to serve the whole. "The order of the human community results from a striving toward fulfillment of the norm inherent in the

---

[25] Ibid., p. 106.

[26] Arnold Bergstrasser, Goethe's Image of Man and Society (Chicago: Henry Regnery, Co., 1949), p. 94.

nature of man."[27] Harmony and discipline result as growing and striving individuals operate within the orderliness of "innate, inherent," natural laws of society.

Kant, Goethe, and Schiller had more in common than either Goethe or Kant would admit. Goethe was a student of Herder, who in turn had been a student of Kant. Schiller[28] was a Kantian who was educated by Goethe to romanticism, while Schiller acquainted Goethe with the finer points of Kantian philosophy. Most historians agree that Goethe, in contrast to Herder, felt a great admiration for Kant. Goethe often criticized Kant's philosophy, not because the content and form were weak, but because Goethe thought Kant set too close a limit on the mind.[29]

Schiller's life, of course, was too short to profoundly affect political thought as did Kant and Goethe. However, threads of thought that are unmistakably the same run through all three. For example, Kant believed that

---

[27] Ibid., p. 96. For a discussion of Goethe's views on government and world affairs, see pp. 76-99.

[28] For a partial discussion of Kant's influence on Schiller, see William F. Mainland, Schiller and the Changing Past (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1957), pp. 167-168 and 176.

[29] For a discussion of Kant's limitation on the power of the mind compared to Goethe's concept, see Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 84-85.

civilization was "the setting in which man is to test and prove his freedom. And he must undergo this test again and again."[30] Similarly, Goethe expresses this idea in Faust when he writes: "He only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew."[31] In the same vein, Schiller expresses the striving nature of man in his Fortune when he writes, "Surely the man is great who has shaped and created himself [Italics his]."[32] The unattainable is common to all three.[33]

Unlike the romantic philosophers who were to follow, Kant, Goethe, and Schiller were not narrow or restrictive in their organicism. Their cosmopolitanism led others, such as Fichte and Schelling,[34] to reason that such an all-encompassing philosophy could certainly be applied to the particulars of nationalism.

---

[30] Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 42-43.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Mann, Last Essays, p. 77.

[33] This unattainability of the "ideal" is epitomized by the creation by Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenburg) of what is symbolized as the "Blue Flower of Romanticism." For a discussion of this aspect see William Rose, Men, Myths and Movements in German Literature, p. 182.

[34] See chapters on Fichte and Schelling that follow in this work.

CHAPTER III

FICHTE AND HEGEL

With the ambiguous, stilted manuscripts of Fichte and Hegel, the poetic expression of romantic organicism by Goethe and Schiller became philosophical prose. Rather than applying the concept of the whole to the universal aspects of poetic phenomena such as trees and moss, happiness and sorrow, life and death, Fichte and Hegel used the organic concept in relation to man and his collective position in nature, in a state.

Fichte, a student of Kant and self-appointed successor to and interpreter of Kantian philosophy in the romantic vernacular,[1] was most concerned with man's entry into organized society from a state of "coarse" anarchy. According to Fichte, the original civil contract of an infant state demanded

> The union of the will of two people. . . . /He/ called this union of their wills the materialiter common will /italics his/. In it the private will of both is united into a common will.[2]

This was not only commanded by man's natural tendencies; it was demanded. Just as a leaf could not exist severed

---

[1] H. S. Reiss, The Political Thought of the German Romantics: 1793-1815 (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, pub., 1955), p. 44.

[2] Ibid., p. 60, as translated from "Civil Contract," J. G. Fichte: Werke, ed. cit., iii, pp. 191-209.

from its tree, or a fire burn without its fuel, man could not exist or find happiness outside a society of his kind. For Fichte, outside of union, nothing existed: it was not reality.[3] Only the state, the union into a common will, was real and living.

Man was to enter the State with the full understanding that

> co-existence of freedoms is possible only if every free being makes it a law unto himself to restrict his own freedom by the concept of the freedom of all others [italics mine].[4]

Moreover, the law of the civil contract, or the state, should provide "that the limits of exclusive freedom of each individual . . . shall be protected even by compulsion [italics mine]. . . ."[5] Thus far, the entry of man into his state differs very little from the entry of man into any state. In every state individual freedom is limited by the rights of all and is enforced by law, by "compulsion." However, Fichte's organic state becomes more than a superimposed structure as soon as the state is formed--by nature. He says:

> Nature joins together . . . in a state what it had separated by the production of several individuals. . . . Mankind is one

---

[3] Ibid., p. 72, from "Civil Contract."

[4] Ibid., p. 45, as translated from "Theory of Right," J. G. Fichte: Werke, ed. cit., iii, pp. 92-110.

[5] Ibid., p. 44.

> single organized and organizing entity of reason. . . . Already the natural organization of the state . . . removes . . . [individual] independence and blends individual entities in to a whole, until morality transforms the whole race into one complete entity.[6]

Since man is an organizing entity of reason, he is compelled by his nature to enter an organic state for "no one has an external right against reason."[7] Moreover, the morality of the individual of making a law "unto himself" respecting the freedoms of others lubricates the workings of the organic state. "The concept [of the state] which has been put forward will be fully explained by the concept . . . of a tree."[8] In a living state, just as in a living tree, each part must do its duty for the good of the whole. Leaves must do the task of leaves and not of the trunk; the trunk must function as a trunk and not as the roots and so forth: each part preserves its own life by preserving the life of the whole.[9]

---

[6] Ibid., p. 68, as translated from "Civil Contract." Morality, in the sense used here, is founded upon the individual's ability to take the collective law as his own.

[7] Ibid., pp. 122 and 123, as translated from "Addresses to the German People," 13th Address, J. G. Fichte: Werke, ed. cit., vii, pp. 459-480.

[8] Ibid., p. 68, as translated from "Civil Contract."

[9] Ibid.

Therefore, in Fichte's state, and in the content of the law which makes the state a reality, there is no place for individual capricious freedom. The influence of caprice makes the law unjust, "and brings into the union the seed of discord . . ."[10] hence, the destruction of the state.

Furthermore, Fichte believed that "the state alone unites an indefinite number of men into a closed whole, into a totality [italics his]. . . ."[11] Thus, the state is all-powerful and "the aim of the state [is] to fully procure [the right of being a human for all individuals]."[12] If this right is threatened, the whole state is obligated to seek justice for:

> The whole is . . . the owner of all property and rights of all individuals, in so far as it considers . . . any injury of these as if it had been done to itself [to the whole state] . . .[13]

Like Kant,[14] Fichte felt it only right for one who had subjected himself to the law "to compel" another who

---

[10] Ibid., p. 57, as translated from "Theory of Right."

[11] Ibid., p. 89, as translated from "The Closed Commercial State," J. G. Fichte: Werke, ed. cit., iii, pp. 397-403.

[12] Ibid., p. 121, as translated from "On the Creation of the Rational State," J. G. Fichte: Werke, ed. cit., vii, pp. 574-581.

[13] Ibid., p. 70, as translated from "Civil Contract."

[14] Kant's ideas on people living in anarchy are quite parallel to Fichte's. "The man, or the nation, that live

had not subjected himself to do so.[15] "Every individual has . . . the right to compel every individual he meets to enter the state . . . or else . . . leave his sphere of activity."[16] This follows the line of reasoning that every one must serve the whole, that there is no room in the organic state for dissonance.[17] But, "as a result of this proposition all men . . . would eventually be compelled to become united in one single state."[18]

Going further into Fichte's organic concepts, there is evidence that organicism gave license for conquest. Just

---

in a state of nature, deprives me of . . . security, and attacks me without being an aggressor, by the mere circumstance of living contiguous to me, in a state of anarchy and without laws; menaced perpetually by him . . . I have a right to compel him, either to associate with me under the dominion of common laws, or to quit my neighborhood." Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 11. With Kant, as with Fichte, the right to compel applied both domestically and internationally. Further, Kant reasoned that "If I do my duty in the post assigned me . . . there is no reason why the duty of obeying should rest on me alone. . . ." Perpetual Peace, p. 12.

[15] Reiss, The Political Thought of the German Romantics, p. 47, as translated from "Theory of Right."

[16] Ibid., p. 73, as translated from "International and Cosmopolitan Law," J. G. Fichte: Werke, ed. cit., iii, pp. 369-381.

[17] Ibid., p. 71, as translated from "Civil Contract," "Anyone who is not in the contract has no legal relationship at all and is legally excluded completely. . . ."

[18] Ibid., p. 73, as translated from "International and Cosmopolitan Law."

as any living organism needs room to grow, or else it dies; so, too, must the state continue to grow to include "all men" and all territory. If a nation has remained faithful to natural laws and finds its territory too small, then it may "desire to enlarge [itself by conquest]."[19]

All this leads Fichte to lament Germany's position under Napoleon. "If only the German nation had remained united with a common will and a common power . . .," all other Europeans would have slaughtered themselves and only Germans would have remained untouched, safe within their preservation of the whole.[20]

Like Fichte, Hegel believed that "all the value that man has . . . he has through the state."[21] But unlike Fichte, Hegel went further than organic law as the basis for a civil contract. Hegel's organic state stemmed from spirit. To Hegel, "the spiritual individual, the people, . . . an organic whole, is what [he called] the state,"[22] and the "concrete actuality of the state is the spirit of

---

[19] Ibid., p. 103, as translated from "Addresses to the German People," 13th Address.

[20] Ibid., p. 104.

[21] G. W. F. Hegel, "The State as the Realization of the Idea," Reason in History (trans. Robert S. Hartman, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 52.

[22] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

the people."[23] Therefore, since man's universal consciousness possessed two realms, one of nature and one of spirit, the original civil contract did not spring solely from natural law, but had its basis in spiritual law.[24]

With Hegel, as with Kant, Reason was the foundation of right. But in contrast to Kant who set limits upon Reason, Hegel's Reason did not limit the power of the mind but dialectically proved that "the true is universal in and for itself, . . . as such it can be only in and for thought."[25] It was in this "Reason" that Hegel went beyond Kant and Fichte. And as a consequence of his "Reason," Hegel departed from the intuitive poetic concepts of Goethe and Schiller. For Hegel, "feeling without reason [was] the lowest form of mental content." To him, pure feeling was animalism that got rid of truth by being subjective.[26] However, from a combination of

---

[23] Ibid., p. 52.

[24] Ibid., p. 20, from "The Idea of History." Again on page 51, in "The State as the Realization of the Idea," Hegel explains that a true state is not externally imposed but that it arises from the spirit of the people, that they are united by the "holy bond that ties the men, the spirits together."

[25] Ibid., p. 18, from "Reason as the Basis of History."

[26] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

of feeling and reason arose Hegel's state concept.

> This essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational will; it is the moral whole, the State. It is that actuality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom [italics his]. . . .[27]

Whereas Fichte primarily concerned himself with the entry of man into the organic state, Hegel applied his theories to the duties and freedoms of man after he entered the state. According to Hegel, "the true state is the ethical whole and the realization of freedom."[28] "The State is an organism. . . ."[29] "The State is real. . . ."[30] If a hand is severed from the body, it still appears to be a hand, but it has no reality. Likewise, an individual severed from his state has no reality, no freedom.[31] Therefore, "the state is the organization of the concept of freedom."[32] Only inside the state could an individual realize not only his own freedoms, but also the freedoms of his fellow men. "Law, morality, the State, and they alone are the positive reality and satisfaction

---

[27] Ibid., p. 49, from "The State as the Realization of the Idea."

[28] Jacob Loewenberg, Hegel Selections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 443, as translated from G. W. F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Law," The Philosophy of Right.

[29] Ibid., p. 445.

[30] Ibid., p. 446.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., p. 444.

of freedom."[33] And like Fichte, Hegel believed that "the caprice of the individual [was] not freedom . . .," but merely license of particular desires.[34]

The responsibility of the individual in Hegel's organic state consisted of two duties. First, "the morality of the individual . . . consists in his fulfilling the duties of his social position."[35] Each person, like a leaf of a tree, had to function within his place in society else the life of the whole, and consequently his life, would be endangered. To investigate the content of his duty was unnecessary.[36]

Following the same vein, the second primary duty of an individual in the state was to remember that

> . . . each individual is also a child of a people . . . He must bring the will demanded by his people to his own consciousness, . . . The individual does not invent his own content; he is what he is by acting out the universal as his own content. . . .

---

[33]Hegel, "The State as the Realization of the Idea," Reason in History, p. 50.

[34]Ibid. Both Hegel's and Fichte's concept was in terms of the organic whole. Here Kant disagrees. "Legal . . . exterior liberty is not, as it is ordinarily defined [as caprice], the faculty of doing whatever one wishes to do, provided he injures not another." Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 12.

[35]Ibid., p. 37, from "The Idea of History."

[36]Ibid. Kant also believed that the nature of free man does not question the right of what others do, he conforms. Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 50.

> Through this . . .[37] he maintains the whole of ethical life.

Thus, the particular becomes universal and the state becomes a breathing dynamic entity. Droplets of distilled water moving through a condensing coil are distinguishable as single units until they emerge together to form a container of pure, clear water. This is the ideal organic concept of Hegel's state. The particular, the individual, is necessary to form the state. But in the state, there is no particular, no single entity. Therefore, "the universal must be actualized through the particular,"[38] but inside the organic state, by nature, the particular has to perish[39] in order to "maintain the whole of ethical life," the ethical state.

"What counts in a state is the practice of acting according to a common will. . . ."[40] As soon as the common will is established, it becomes the ethical whole. As has already been established, "the tree state is the ethical whole," consequently, the common will is the ethical whole. Therefore, since the common will originates in the minds of the people, the state becomes a creation

---

[37] Ibid., pp. 37-38. [38] Ibid., p. 35.

[39] Ibid., p. 43.

[40] Ibid., p. 52, from "The State as the Realization of the Idea."

of the mind. Thus:

> The state is the ethical idea. It is the ethical mind . . . knowing and thinking itself. [It is] an absolute unmoved end in itself [and] this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the State [even if, as Fichte wrote, compulsion was necessary].[41]

With the confirmation of the state comes the problem of government, the direction of the whole, the constitution. "The State must, in its constitution, permeate all situations,"[42] leaving nothing to chance. The source of law is simple--it is the rational work of centuries, "it is developed in a people."[43] But "what constitutes the state is a matter of trained intelligence, not a matter of 'the people.'"[44] The trained intelligence is the sovereign, for "the people without its monarch is a

---

[41] T. L. Jarman, The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany (New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1956), p. 47, as quoted from Hegel, Philosophy of Light (trans. T. M. Knox, 1942), pp. 155-156. Hegel also drew an analogy between the ethical state and organic family structure when he wrote, "The State is the self-conscious ethical substance, the unification of the family principle with that of civil society [italics his]." Loewenberg, Hegel Selections, p. 245, as translated from Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.

[42] Loewenberg, Hegel Selections, pp. 448-449, as translated from Hegel, "The Philosophy of Law," The Philosophy of Right.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Hegel, "The State as the Realization of the Idea," Reason in History, p. 57.

formless mass."[45] However, he is not to be an ordinary man because "sovereignty is the personality of the whole, and this is represented in reality by the person of the monarch."[46] Therefore, the monarch has to be able to see and comprehend the whole without atomizing it. He must understand the particular through the universal: he must be a world-historical personage.

"World-historical individuals are those who grasp . . . a higher universal [and] make it their own purpose. . . ."[47] By grasping the universal, these men are able to stir the innermost consciousness of the people.

> For this reason their fellow men follow these soul-leaders. For they [the people] feel the irresistible power of their own spirit embodied in them [the soul-leaders].[48]

Both Fichte and Hegel were concerned with morality, law, and freedom. Kant, Goethe, and Schiller also had regard for these. However, Kant was in search for "anything worth knowing" in the universe, Goethe and Schiller strove

---

[45] Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 450.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Hegel, "Idea of History," Reason in History, p. 39.

[48] Ibid., pp. 40-41. For a discussion of the determination and direction of the whole, see Loewenberg, Hegel Selections, p. 113, as quoted from Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutics. For Hegel's influence on Hitler and his followers, see the quote from Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History and the following

to understand and relate poetic wholeness, while Fichte and Hegel burdened themselves with the task of setting man in his society. Kant studied everything in order to know; Goethe and Schiller observed the greatness and wholeness of Nature in order to discover man's relation to it. In contrast, Fichte and Hegel devoted their energies to explaining the organization of man, thereby ignoring Nature except when a natural phenomenon was either useful to man or expedient to their explanation of him.

There is no basic difference in Fichtean and Hegelian organicism. Hegel only enlarged Fichte's state organicism and introduced spirit into the whole. And like Kant, both believed in rule of law, that "only the will that obeys the law is free, for it obeys itself, being in itself /the common will/, is free."[49] To cite more of their works would invite redundancy; their organicism is as glaring as their glorification of the state. Merely to cite their works is to prove their organicism.

---

commentary in Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (revised ed., New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1961), pp. 335 and 352. See also Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 72.

[49] Ibid., p. 53, from "The State as the Realization of the Idea."

CHAPTER IV

SCHELLING

Schelling has been referred to as the "Prince of Romantics" but this applies only to the period of his life before 1810.[1] For the most part, the works and thoughts of Schelling are little known. The noted historian Hans Kohn makes only fleeting mention of Schelling in his works,[2] but spends several pages in discussion of Goethe, Fichte, and Hegel. However, in all fairness, except for the last twenty years of his life which were heavily influenced by Spinoza's philosophy, Schelling contributed much to Romantic ideology. If Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens for the use of man, Schelling returned it there for the same reason.

Most of Schelling's ideas deal with art[3] and the mystic relationship of man to the gods, the arising of man from darkness into light. Therefore, Schelling

---

[1] F. W. J. Schelling, Of Human Freedom (trans. James Gutmann, Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1936), p. xiv.

[2] The works particularly referred to are The Mind of Germany (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), and Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century (third edition, revised; New York: Harper and Row, 1966). The nature of these works, since others of the "Golden Age of Germany" are discussed, should include more than mere mention of Schelling.

[3] For Schelling's ideas on art, see F. W. J. Schelling, Of Human Freedom (trans. James Gutmann, Chicago:

considered the individual in two spheres, "as an end in itself and as a means to the community." But the two were always considered together since the individual could "never be considered in isolation."[4] For Schelling, as with Fichte and Hegel, "dependence [did not necessarily] exclude autonomy or even freedom."[5] "A single organ, like the eye, is possible only in the organism of the whole; nevertheless it has a life of its own, indeed a kind of freedom. . . ."[6]

In recognizing the possible "kind of freedom" of a single unit, Schelling departed somewhat from Fichte's ethical philosophy of the mind knowing before reality occurs. Schelling admitted the possibility that a thing may have a reality in itself which intellectual intuition

---

Open Court Pub. Co., 1936). This volume deals almost exclusively with art and its relation to man, calling attention to the organicism of art as applied to man. For a comparison of Hegel's concept of art based on reason, see Jacob Loewenberg, "Introduction to the Philosophy of Art," Hegel Selections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 311-337.

[4]H. S. Reiss, The Political Thought of the German Romantics: 1793-1815 (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, pub., 1955), p. 23.

[5]F. W. J. Schelling, Of Human Freedom (trans. James Gutmann, Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1936), p. 18. This is a translation of Schelling's Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände.

[6]Ibid., p. 19. Here again Schelling likens the organization of art to man. For example, on painting, Schelling says that although a part of a portrait may

had to interpret. Again, this is a unique feature of Schelling's thinking, a combination of reason and feeling---intellectual intuition---rejecting philosophy based on pure reason.[7]

In the beginning, according to Schelling, man existed in darkness, chaos, and anarchy ruled by feeling. Then intuitive reason developed enabling man to separate the chaotic from the real and thus promoted man's emergence into the light organized into a society. Therefore, "unity appears which contains all within it and which has lain hidden in the depths /of darkness/."[8]

Following the same idea, organicism becomes plain in Schelling's interpretation of three phases of history. In the first phase, which he called the tragic era, man existed in unorganized darkness ruled by Fate. In the

---

express something alone, "the particular counts /nothing/ by itself; the Universe takes its place, and that, which by itself would not be beautiful, becomes so in the harmony of the whole!" Kuno Franche and William G. Howard, The German Classics (New York: The German Publications Society, 1913), p. 120, as translated from F. W. J. Schelling, "The Plastic Arts."

[7] Ibid., p. 21.

[8] Ibid., p. 36. Here, unlike Goethe and Schiller who referred to Greek antiquity, Schelling refers to Christian or even pagan antiquity as the darkness from which man emerged, knowing, even then, intuitively, the "holy bonds" that bound the spirit of man together. Evidences of this knowing lay in the myths and legends which a people knew before any of them were remotely aware of the Greeks.

second, ruled by Nature, which included the rise and fall of Rome, "unconsciously and even against their will [the nations] were forced to serve a plan of nature . . ., the all-inclusive league of peoples, the universal state." This era brought forth in man for the first time, organization, morality, law, and art. All events of this era were natural events. [Italics mine][9]

The third phase, the future, Schelling was positive could be governed by Fate and Nature, but Fate must be subordinated to Nature and Nature subordinated to the mind. Therefore, the future would be ruled by a "consciousness" of Nature and man would endow his universal state with foresight evolved from experiences of his past, his antiquity.[10]

Hegel's philosophy combined the subjective with the rational to form an organic will in the state. Schelling applied the same concept to philosophy itself. "Idealism is the soul of Philosophy; Realism is its body; only the two together constitute a living whole."[11] Idealism, the subjective, the mystic, was the spirit of Philosophy and,

---

[9] Ibid., p. 109, as quoted from F. W. J. Schelling, "System of Transcendental Idealism," 1800, Works, III, pp. 327-634.

[10] Ibid., p. 110, as quoted from "System of Transcendental Idealism."

[11] Ibid., p. 30.

coupled with reality, constituted an entity. Therefore, the body, the real, has a mystic core and if man's essence were spirit, then spirit unites with spirit, man unites with Philosophy and reacts to the Ideal. "For only that is free which acts according to the laws of its inner being. . . ."[12] And "only he who has tasted [such] freedom can feel the desire to make over everything . . ., to spread it throughout the universe,"[13] to compel everyone he meets to join in his freedom. In other words, man's inner being is the same as Philosophy's inner being, that is, Idealism. Thus, there emerges in Schelling's organicism a predominance of the mystic, the Ideal. In the unity of collective man, this Ideal becomes a self-conscious reality of a unity "which has lain hidden in the depths."

Schelling's work is more difficult to analyze than are the works of Fichte or Hegel. Reverence for the Idea is common both to Hegel and Schelling. However, Hegel's perpetual Idea was founded in reason while Schelling's eternal Idea was no speculative process. This is especially true in Schelling's search for divinity. For Schelling, the nature of God had to be experienced through

---

[12] Ibid., p. 62.

[13] Ibid., p. 12.

"intuitive reason." The only process by which this could be realized was to find God through myth and revelation where He had existed since all time. For both Schelling and Hegel, "There [was] no time where the Spirit [the Idea] has not been nor will not be . . .,"[14] but the process by which they looked for the Idea differed. However, both searched for the Idea within organicism.

> In [Schelling's] philosophy of nature he does not liken nature to an aggregate of mechanisms, but . . . rather to a number of living organisms interacting on each other. Under Kant's Critique of Judgment he considers a work of art to be an organism. . . . Likewise, the state . . . is best described as an organism. This gives rise to a poetic conception of the state.[15]

---

[14] G. W. F. Hegel, "Course of History," Reason in History (trans. Walter Cerf, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1963), p. 95.

[15] Reiss, loc. cit. One note further on the concept of the individual versus the whole. Schelling commented on love as a whole made up of the divine and the identity (ego). "If each entity were not a Whole but only a part of the Whole there would be more love." But this is impossible "since each is a Whole but nonetheless does not exist and cannot be without the other." F. W. J. Schelling, Of Human Freedom, pp. 115-116, as quoted from "Aphorisms Introductory to the Philosophy of Nature."

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Fichte, and Hegel, all except Schelling, were dead by 1833, but their ideas lived on. All were Germans: all were directly or indirectly affected by Kant. All used the organic in their philosophy.

Kant used the organic merely as a tool for understanding and explaining facets of his philosophy. Goethe and Schiller, on the other hand, used the organic as a tool of poetic genius, the only two of the six romanticists mentioned who were poets. While Kant remained loyal, and "even subservient to the King of Prussia,"[1] in Goethe and Schiller the spirit of defiance appeared.[2] But their defiance was not so extreme as to reject completely the ideas of the French Revolution. At a time when Germany began to surrender to Germanophilism, Goethe firmly upheld "the values of the universal civilization of the West, its cosmopolitan freedom of the mind. . . ."[3] Schiller,

---

[1]Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 23.

[2]George Brandes, The Romantic School in Germany (Vol. II of Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature. Six vols.: London: William Heinemann, 1923), p. 23.

[3]Kohn, The Mind of Germany, p. 26.

too, was determined to override the German preoccupation with politics and thus re-unite a divided world with "Truth and Beauty."[4]

However, Fichte and Hegel, unlike Schiller, saw the coming of Napoleon onto German soil. While Goethe maintained his "Europeanism" to a point where he was considered "unpatriotic,"[5] Fichte gave speeches outlining what it meant to be a German in such times. With Hegel, as with Fichte, the "dream of freedom shared the fate of the dream of unification,"[6] as the Germans, the Prussians, rose up to resist Napoleon. Therefore, the organic, in the hands of Fichte and Hegel, became a tool of resistance to France.

With the exception of Kant, who operated within limits, the spirit of German Romanticists was unreality, or the art of making the unreal become real through the mind or reason. "The Romantic worship of imagination [began] with Fichte" in his lauding of the Ego, in "what is for us can be only through us."[7] The Hellenism of Goethe and

---

[4] Ibid., p. 28.

[5] Brandes, The Romantic School in Germany, p. 31.

[6] Brandes, Young Germany (Vol. VI of Main Currents), p. 2. For a discussion of "Philosophy and Reaction" in Germany see pp. 13-16.

[7] Brandes, The Romantic School, pp. 38-39.

Schiller was replaced by the Germanism of Fichte and Hegel. More and more, when the Romantics spoke of a "human being," they spoke in terms of a "German being" since that was what they knew and understood best.

Schelling applied the doctrine of the Ego not only to philosophy but also to art and religion and dwelt upon "the mysterious nature of the mind."[8] With Schelling, mysticism became complete. After Hegel's death, Schelling was called to Berlin to lend a hand with the "Christian-Germanic" ideology of religion and preached his "Philosophy of Revelation" based on myth.[9] For Schelling, the prerequisite for meditation and understanding was to be German. He says, "The sense of art and feeling [understanding] for nature will surely remain with us as long as we are Germans . . ."[10]

From the rationale of Kant to the ~~mystic~~ mystique of Schelling, the organic concept of the universe was applied; only the emphasis of application differed. Even though Schelling was in opposition to Hegel for most of his life,[11] their basic ideas were parallel. Therefore, Germans began to be

---

[8] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[9] Ibid., p. 15.

[10] F. W. J. Schelling, Of Human Freedom (trans. James Gutmann, Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1936), p. 116, as quoted from "Heidelburg Literary Annuals," 1808, Vol. I, sec. 5, part 2, p. 242.

[11] For a discussion of the Hegel-Schelling dispute, see F. W. J. Schelling, Of Human Freedom, pp. xxviii-xix.

conscious of their folklore, traditions, and legends. They could understand intuitively the tales of the Grimm Brothers far better than tales of the Iliad for they knew them better. These tales were a part of the people.

A fear of anarchy inclined the Germans toward organicism; anarchy was a natural threat to their natural orderliness. Therefore, organicism was a natural result of the German reaction against French capricious individualism which led to materialism, atheism, and anarchy. Thus, when Fichte wrote, "It is the destination of our race to unite in one body,"[12] the Germans had begun to think not of race as mankind, but as German. The German people were prepared to believe that all that was good was German.

---

[12]Kuno Franche and William G. Howard, The German Classics (New York: The German Publications Society, 1913), V, p. 41, as quoted from J. G. Fichte, "The Destiny of Man."

SECTION II

ORGANICISM IN NAZISM

ORGANICISM IN NAZISM

For one hundred years, romantic organicism lay in the backwash of German history. The forefront was occupied by such events as the revolutions of 1848, the Crimean War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the ~~consequental~~ consequential unification of Germany by militarism. Then came the Great War. The aftermath of World War I provided fertile soil for the rejuvenation of organic concepts.

The New "Thousand-Year Reich" was founded in the living whole of the German people. According to Ernst Rudolf Huber, the Nazi Reich had no written foundation but existed in ". . . the unwritten basic political order of the Reich. One [recognized] it in the spiritual powers which [filled] the people . . ."[1] Moreover, the advantage of such unwritten law, derived from tradition, was that the principles of the law were dynamic, never rigid. Therefore, the law remained ". . . in a constant, living movement. Not dead institutions but living principles [determined] the nature of the new constitutional order."[2]

---

[1] Readings on Fascism and National Socialism (selected by members of the Dept. of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Denver: Alan Swallow Company, Inc., n.d.), pp. 62-63, as translated from Ernst Rudolf Huber, Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich (Hamburg, 1939), pp. 54-55.

[2] Ibid., p. 63.

Huber believed that a secure state could be built on this basic principle of hereditary law. Similar to Hegel's combination of the subjective and rational wills, Huber advocated that "there is no people without an objective unity, but there is also none without a common consciousness of unity."[3]

Also similar to Fichte, who believed that outside the whole, nothing existed, Huber seemed to infer that a people could not exist outside of unity, that outside the whole there existed only an aggregate of individuals. Therefore, "this consciousness of self [the will of unity] . . . awakens in a people its will to historical formation: the will to action."[4] Thus, a people becomes a reality, a living dynamic being.

Another similarity between Fichte and Huber is their reference to the closed nature of an organic state. Fichte primarily treated the closed commercial state while Huber's application was related to a political concept. "The German people forms a closed community which [recognizes] no national borders,"[5] said Huber. In other words, irrespective of boundaries, any place where German blood flowed or the German language was spoken, there was the

---

[3] Ibid., from Huber, Constitutional Law, pp. 153-155.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 64, from Huber, Constitutional Law, p. 158.

universal German community. This application of organicism was more than Realpolitik or Metapolitik, but a new inclusive Kultur-politik concept. Further, "in the theory of the [closed] folk-Reich, people and state [were] conceived as an inseparable unity,"[6] a unity which knew no limit except the limit of a people itself.

Another Nazi writer, Gottfried Neese, made a distinction between the state and the Volk from which the state arose. However, he still considered both to be in unison. Neese wrote, "In contrast to the state, the people form a true organism. . . ."[7] That is to say, the state is merely an outgrowth of organic activity, the overt expression or organization of the "true organism," the people. Neese likened his true organism to the anatomy of a living body. He states:

> This living unity of the people has its cells in its individual members, and just as in every body there are certain cells to perform certain tasks, this is likewise the case in the body of the people. The individual is bound to his people not only physically but mentally and spiritually and he is influenced by these ties in all his manifestations.[8]

---

[6] Ibid., from Huber, Constitutional Law, pp. 165-166.

[7] Ibid., p. 65, as translated from Gottfried Neese, The National Socialist German Workers Party--An Attempt at Legal Interpretation (Stuttgart, 1935), p. 51.

[8] Ibid. This is Neese's parallel to Hegel's "world-historical individual" or "soul leader."

In Neese's analogy, there is a striking resemblance to Hegelian morality.[9] In addition, Neese recalls the spiritual bonds of Hegel but adds the physical fetter to his organic concept. Further, there is evidence of Schelling spiritualism, the transcendental mentality.

Neese also recognized that a people had no value without direction and provided, in his organic ideal state, for the management of the masses. For Neese, the mass counted for nothing because "~~The~~ the people . . . [is] never politically active as a whole, but only through those who embody its will."[10] Here Neese furnished a basis for the sovereignty principle, the leadership of the Reich. Again there is a reverting to the Hegelian "sovereign as the personality of the whole" ideology.

Therefore, Neese reached a definition of the nation as a combination of organism and organization, the folk united with the state. He defined the nation and the relationship of National Socialism to the nation as follows:

---

[9]Hegel felt that ". . . the individuals have their assigned business and hence their assigned duties. Their morality consists in acting accordingly." G. W. F. Hegel, "The Idea of History," Reason in History (trans. Robert Hartman, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1953), p. 37.

[10]Readings in Fascism and National Socialism, p. 66, from Neese, The NSDAP, pp. 60-61.

> The nation is the complete agreement between organism and organization, the perfect formation of a naturally grown being. . . . Nationalism is nothing more than the outwardly directed striving to maintain this inner unity of people and state and socialism is the inwardly directed striving for the same end [Italics his].[11]

Dr. Herbert Scurla, Reich Minister for Science, Education, and Folk Culture, agreed with Neese's ideas but added a very important factor, blood. Dr. Scurla wrote, "The folk is both a living creature and a spiritual configuration, in which the individuals are included through . . . blood and spirit [Italics mine]."[12] As a consequence of the folk being dual natured, it ". . . collects into the folk whatever according to blood and spirit belongs to it."[13] This last statement stands in support of Huber's "closed community" which knows no borders. In addition, Scurla reinforced Neese's National Socialist definition when he wrote:

> National Socialism is no invented system of rules . . . but the world view of the German people, which . . . concedes neither to the State . . . nor the individual any privileges which endanger the security . . . [of the whole].[14]

---

[11] Ibid., from Neese, The NSDAP, pp. 65-66.

[12] Ibid., as translated from Dr. Herbert Scurla, Basic Principles of National Socialism with Special References to Foreign Countries (Berlin, 1938), pp. 10-11.

[13] Ibid., p. 67.

[14] Ibid., from Scurla, Basic Principles, p. 13.

Friedrich Alfred Beck answered the question of what element served to give the people life, the mystical essence of existence. Beck stated that "~~Race~~ race and people belong together [Italics his]."[15] Beck went on to say that National Socialism had breathed this new life, this new vital energy, into the Volk. According to Beck's definition,

> By people we understand an entire living body which is racially uniform. . . . Through such an interpretation the people takes on a significance. . . . Race is the vital law of arrangement which gives the people its distinctive form. . . . [However] Without the people the race has no life; without race the people has no permanence . . ., the racial unity will be preserved through the totality of the people.[16]

Thus, with the introduction of race, the organ of the people is complete, capable of the eternal. But in order for a people to remain eternal, race must remain pure. Race, by its purity, becomes the latent heat of fusion which makes the summation of the whole greater than the summation of the parts. Race is the little extra transcendent vitality. Beck lucidly explained the whole romantic concept so it applied to the German Reich as follows:

---

[15] Ibid., as translated from Friedrich Alfred Beck, Education in the Third Reich (Dortmund and Breslau, 1936), pp. 20-21.

[16] Ibid., p. 68.

> According to the liberalistic interpretation the whole consists [merely] of a summation of its parts. According to the National Socialist organic conception the whole comes before the parts; it does not arise from the parts but it is already contained in the parts themselves; all parts are microcosmic forms of the whole. This organic conception of the whole is the deepest natural justification of the basic political character of all organic life.[17]

Therefore, the organic concept, according to Beck's National Socialist definition, contained within itself its own justification for being. And National Socialism, since it embraced all elements of the organic concept, naturally became ". . . the eternal law of . . . German life . . ."[18]

The Führer Principle, mentioned previously in connection with Neese's direction of the masses, was also justified by organicism. Within the organic state, the Führer is not an ordinary prince---although he may possess a princely bearing--and does not necessarily have "royal" blood in his veins. However, this last statement is not necessarily in reference to the German Reich since all pure German blood was royal: all Germans possessed it. But more than blood, the Führer embodied unique qualities. Ernst Huber explained the Führer-Reich as follows:

---

[17] Ibid., p. 69, from Beck, Education, p. 57.

[18] Ibid., p. 70, from Beck, Education, p. 140.

> The Führer is the bearer of the people's will; he is independent of all groups . . ., but he is bound by laws /which grow out of the nature of the people/. . . . He is no "organ" of the state in the sense of a mere executive . . . /but/ is rather himself the bearer of the collective will of the people. In his will the will of the people is realized. He transforms the mere feelings of the people into a conscious will. . . . Such a collective will is not fiction . . ., but a political reality which finds its expression in the Führer. . . . It is present in the people, but the Führer raises it to consciousness and discloses it. . . .[19]

As a consequence of the Führer's content of the will of the people, he became not only the "father" of the people but also the originator of all laws. "The Führer unites in himself all the sovereign authority of the Reich; . . . The authority of the Führer is . . . all embracing . . ."[20]

With the inclusion of the Führer Principle, the German organic Reich is complete. Schelling viewed the organic state as a system of interacting entities which form the whole. The Nazi Reich was the realization of this universality. The internal organs of the Reich were the people, the will of the people, the race of the people,

---

[19] Ibid., pp. 74-75, from Huber, Constitutional Law, pp. 194-198.

[20] Ibid., pp. 76-77, from Huber, Constitutional Law, p. 230.

the state, the Führer, and the National Socialist Party. All were the whole: all were bound to each other. In each case, the other organs served as justification for the existence of any single organ and all single organs justified the whole. For instance, the Volk is the state, the state is the Führer, the Führer is the Volk, the Volk is the National Socialist Party, the Party is the Führer, and the Führer is the Party,[21] the Führer is the will of the people, the people is race. Organicism is the basis for the inseparability of these organs.

The success and security of the organic Reich depended upon one law--obedience; the Führer was always right. "A true organic identity is only possible when . . . the people recognizes its embodiment in one man and feels itself to be one nature with him."[22] His authority embraces ". . . the entire people, which is bound to the Führer in loyalty and obedience [dictated by nature]."[23]

---

[21] Ibid., p. 79, as quoted from Robert Ley, Nazi Organizational Director, from an article in the Angriff.

[22] Ibid., p. 77, from Neese, The NSDAP, pp. 144-147.

[23] Ibid., from Huber, Constitutional Law, p. 230.

SECTION III

GENERAL CONCLUSION

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Organicism, by the bookish definition a belief in an inherent primary co-ordination of systems, remained essentially unaltered from the German Romantics to the Nazis. However, the method of application of the organic concept differed. The Romantics used organicism as a means; the Nazis employed it as an end.

For example, Kant devoted the use of the organic to the perceiving and explaining of knowledge. In instances where the organic was not sufficiently appropriate to epistemological endeavors, Kant abandoned its use. Goethe and Schiller also limited the use of organicism to their pursuit of poetic nature, employing it in relation to politics only when poetic organicism demanded it. However, this was not the case with Fichte or Hegel.

Fichte's and Hegel's organicism was politically oriented as compared to Kant's epistemological approach and Goethe's and Schiller's poetic usage. Nonetheless, organicism--the application of the universal to the particular and inclusion of the particular within the universal--was common to all of them. It is interesting to note that the Nazi mind received the ideas of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling more readily than the products of Kant, Goethe, and Schiller.

Nazism used organicism as an end, an answer, a justification for all aspects of reality. Whereas the

Romantics ~~philosophied~~ philosophized, the Nazis acted. However, one element, introduced by Wagner,[1] infused daemonism into the Nazi organism: that element was racism. Racism, coupled with the permeating qualities of organicism, led the Germans into colossal acts of barbarism which included genocide and led to World War II.

Organicism grew out of a fundamental conflict between individualism and authority. The German Romantic Revolution, and its foundation of ~~organism~~ organicism, was the German answer to the anarchy of the French Revolution. Therefore, German anti-Westernism was a result of Western political influences in Germany.

The purpose of this work was to prove the existence of organicism in German Romanticism and Nazism and to establish a link between the two. Although the material cited was only a representative sampling of organicism, the link is evident. But in establishing the existence of organicism, three factors became very apparent.

First: the roots of Nazism reach much deeper than Nietzsche or Wagner. They reach, at least, into the elements of romantic organicism. Second: the original

---

[1] For an excellent discussion of the effect of Wagner and Wagnerism on Nazism, see Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind (New York: Capricorn Books, 1961).

organicism was philosophical, not political. Consequently, the evolution of the Pan-Germanism which grew out of the Romantic Movement was cultural rather than political, resulting in a cultural application of politics under the Nazis. The political order of the Nazis arose from the culture of the German people. Third: Romantic organicism was good; it was constructive. However, by abuse, any good thing becomes bad. The Nazis practiced obedience to a fault, thus making their organicism a vice.

With the intellectual explosion which occurred in Germany from 1765 to 1833, Germans began to feel the frustration of being considered second-rate world citizens. During this period Germany led the world in intellectual creative genius--yet Paris, not Berlin, remained the cultural center of Europe. Therefore, Germans rejected not only the military suppression of Germany by France, but also the cultural suppression.

Following World War I, Germany suffered not only military and cultural suppression, but also economic humiliation. It is no wonder, then, that Germans felt a need to "expand or explode." Many, like Hitler, <u>felt</u> that National Socialism would give them meaning, a release for their frustrations. Within the organic National Socialist state, Germans felt, "I belong! I have meaning,

direction, and importance. I am a German!"[2] Therefore, Kultur-politik became the absolute answer, the end; militarism, power, became the means by which the Germans elevated themselves, not to first-rate world citizenship, but rather to supreme world citizenship.

---

[2]For an excellent analysis of the psychology of Hitler, see Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (revised edition, New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1956).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aiken, Henry D. The Age of Ideology. New York: A Mentor Book, New American Library of World Literature, 1956. 283 pp.

Bergstrasser, Arnold. Goethe's Image of Man and Society. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. 318 pp.

Biermann, Berthold. Goethe's World as Seen in Letters and Memoirs. New York: New Directions Books, 1949. 420 pp.

Brandes, George. The Romantic School in Germany. Vol. II of Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature. 6 vols. London: William Heinemann, 1923.

_____. Young Germany. Vol. VI of Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature. 6 vols. London: William Heinemann, 1923.

Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Revised edition. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1961. 780 pp.

Carlyle, Thomas. On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History. New York: Doubleday-Dolphin, n. d. 389 pp.

Cassirer, Ernst. Rousseau, Kant and Goethe. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. 98 pp.

Fichte, Johann G. Addresses to the German People. Trans. R. F. Jones. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1922. 269 pp.

_____. The Vocation of Man. Edited by Roderick Chisholm. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. 154 pp.

Franche, Kuno, and William G. Howard. The German Classics. V. New York: The German Publication Society, 1913.

Goethe, Johann W. Faust. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955. 294 pp.

Hegel, G. W. F. Reason in History. Trans. Robert Hartman. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1953. 95 pp.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1943. 694 pp.

Hutchins, Robert M., and Mortimer J. Adler. Gateway to the Great Books. Vol. V. London: Encyclopedia Britannica, William Benton, publisher, 1963.

Jarman, T. L. The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany. New York: A Signet Book, New American Library of World Literature, 1961. 368 pp.

Kant, Immanuel. Analytic of the Beautiful. Trans. Walter Cerf. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963. 141 pp.

_____. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Trans. John T. Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. 124 pp.

_____. Perpetual Peace. New York: Morningside Hts., Columbia University Press, 1939. 67 pp.

Kohn, Hans. The Mind of Germany. New York: Harper and Row, 1960. 370 pp.

_____. Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century. Third edition; revised. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 309 pp.

Loewenberg, Jacob. Hegel Selections. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. 468 pp.

Mainland, William F. Schiller and the Changing Past. London: William Heinemann, 1957. 198 pp.

Mann, Thomas. Last Essays. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1959. 211 pp.

Neumann, Franz. Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944. New York: Harper and Row, 1944. 649 pp.

Readings on Fascism and National Socialism. Selected by members of the Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Denver: Alan Swallow Co., n.d. 112 pp.

Reiss, H. S. The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 1793-1815. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, publisher, 1955. 211 pp.

Rose, William. Men, Myths and Movements in German Literature. New York: Kennikat Press, 1964. 286 pp.

Schelling, F. W. J. Of Human Freedom. Trans. James Gutmann. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1936. 128 pp.

Thomas, Calvin. The Life and Works of Friedrich Schiller. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1902. 463 pp.

Viereck, Peter. Metapolitics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind. New York: Capricorn Books, 1961. 364 pp.

Whitney, George T., and David F. Bowers. The Heritage of Kant. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962. 426 pp.

Wiskemann, Elizabeth. Europe of the Dictators, 1919-1945. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 287 pp.